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Abstract. Smartphones equipped with advanced positioning technol-
ogy continuously collect users’ location information and make that in-
formation easily accessible to third party app and/or library developers.
Users are becoming increasingly aware of the resultant privacy threats,
and demanding effective privacy preserving solutions that will allow them
to securely use location-based services. In addition, academic and indus-
trial communities are paying special attention to the development of
more friendly and socially-accepted approaches to location privacy. In
this work, we model, design and evaluate LP-Cache´, a mobile platform
based service that protects locations by modifying the location resource
handling process. It applies caching technique to protect users’ private
locations and establishes personalised location permission controls. We
define the design decisions and implementation requirements towards the
viability and feasibility of the model deployment. We also evaluate re-
sources and storage requirements in order to minimise the computational
and communication overheads. Empirical results of 2 months compara-
tive study show a 2.26% change in the network fingerprints at 34 distinct
places that required only 2.07% change in the overall cache storage. Both
these results demonstrate feasibility of the model.
Keywords: Location Privacy, Location-based Services, Smartphones,
Caching, Location-based Applications
1 Introduction
The explosive growth of context-aware mobile apps has leveraged tremendous
opportunities for a whole new class of Location-Based Services (LBS) [32]. Geo-
marketing and geo-social networking, location-based games, monitoring, assisted
eHealth, and energy consumption 3D maps represent a small subset of the third-
party apps nowadays available as LBS and can certainly pose a serious threat
to the users’ privacy [26, 33].
? Updated and extended version of SECRYPT 2016 conference paper with title “LP-
Cache´: Privacy-aware Cache Model for Location-based Apps.”
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Currently, approaches to privacy settings of user location on smartphones1
are based on a binary process2. Users are forced to rely on third party service
providers that in many cases continuously collect, use and share their location
data, and in some cases even prompt the user to give away their position on page
load [2, 26, 16, 33]. Moreover, both academia and industry agree on the urgent
need of adopting a Privacy-by-Design (PbD) approach for the development of
more user-friendly and socially-accepted solutions to location privacy preserva-
tion on their mobile products and services [9].
To encounter these challenges, in [31] the authors introduced the model called
Location Privacy Cache´ (LP-Cache´). LP-Cache´ envisions beyond the simple
grant/deny access method and provides the user with advanced mechanisms
to decide the extent of disclosing location data with service providers. Several
caching based solutions [40, 3, 29] have been proposed to minimise the risk of ma-
jor location privacy threats, but lacking of deployment feasibility. They rely on
unrealistic assumptions such as vast cache data storage requirements, or on the
app developers modifying the code to incorporate their cached databases. LP-
Cache´ incorporates caching technique to determine users’ geographical location
in a privacy preserving manner, and with minimum cache storage requirements.
In this paper we overview the main contributions presented in [31] and, fur-
ther prove LP-Cache´’s features in an extended experimental setting. In particu-
lar, we describe
– A detailed analysis of the current location computation process deployed in
smartphones when running location-based apps.
– A detailed definition of the LP-Cache´ model and architecture as well as its
main implementation requirements.
– A complete performance evaluation of LP-Cache´, analising the wireless ac-
cess point data availability and consistency, and the estimated user resource
and storage requirements. We will also show that LP-Cache´ is feasible with-
out modifying installed apps. Estimated storage requirements and monthly
datasets of wireless acess points have been analysed. Results from the ex-
tended experimental setting help us to determine the scalability of LP-Cache´.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the current loca-
tion computation process and its evaluation. Section 3 reviews the related work.
Section 4 presents the design and architecture of LP-Cache´, and Section 5 fully
elaborates on design decisions and implementation requirements. We evaluate
the feasibility of WiFi APs availability, resources and storage requirements in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes and describes current work as well as sets
future research plans.
1 Throughout this paper, we use the terms smartphones and mobile interchangeably
2 Data protection directives and acts [14, 20] across the globe state that personal
data should not be disclosed or shared with third parties without consent from
subject(s). Such a consent is typically obtained by mandatory acceptance of the
conditions mentioned in the End User License Agreement (EULA), or through opt-
out possibilities and other regulations[25].
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Fig. 1. Current location computation architecture
2 Overview of the Current Location Computation
Process
In this section, we describe roles and processes involved in the current architec-
ture for computing user’s device location.
2.1 Current Architecture
The current location computation architecture to use location-based apps on
smartphones comprises four main entities: 1. Smartphones with installed apps,
2. App Provider, 3. Network Infrastructure, and 4. Location Provider. This archi-
tecture (Figure 1) mainly relies on third party location providers, e.g., Google
Location Service [18], Skyhook [34], and Navizon [27]. The location provider
represents the central database, which maps the received signatures of nearby
wireless access points to the geo-coordinates, i.e., latitude and longitude, so han-
dling every geo-location request. Therefore, the location provider has constant
access to the user’s location as well as to the trajectory data. To respond to
any location request, the location provider maintains a database of surrounding
network infrastructure, including WiFi Access Points (APs), cellular-towers, and
IP addresses, which must be mapped to their exact geographical co-ordinates.
Compared to GPS and cell-tower based positioning, WiFi Positioning Systems
(WPS) is nowadays considered as a very accurate method for location calcula-
tion [34]. Location providers rather use enhanced WPS than GPS, primarily due
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to current smart-mobile devices benefit from built-in WiFi clients that perform
faster than most expensive GPS receivers. This enables the service provider to
get user’s precise location at all times and, as a result, more effective privacy
preservation measures are needed in the current process to mitigate privacy
threats.
WiFi APs continuously announce their existence in the way of network
frames/beacons and transmit their Service Set Identifier (SSID) and Basic Ser-
vice Set Identifier (BSSID)/MAC addresses. Location providers use these WiFi
APs identifers to create network signatures and map them with geo-coordinates,
also called geolocation. IEEE 802.11 states two standardised ways to collect
beacons from WiFi APs: 1. Active scanning, and 2. Passive scanning. Location
providers are capable of deploying systems with either active scanning, passive
scanning, or both together. Location providers use three different ways to collect
geo-location of WiFi APs:
1. Statically- They collect WiFi beacons by the so called wardiving process.
Basically, they map the equipped vehicle’s exact geo-coordinates along with
the signal strength of the captured beacons from surrounded APs.
2. Dynamically- They can collect data from WiFi APs automatically once the
user device uses location services, e.g. Maps and Navigation applications.
The user device as configured to be geolocated acquires unique identifiers
from the surrounding WiFi APs, even if the network is encrypted, and then
sends it over to the location provider in order to perform geolocation calcula-
tion. The collected information is utilised to build and update the database
autonomously, for example, by applying crowdsourcing [41].
3. User input- They encourage users to manually input the WiFi APs’ informa-
tion, i.e., BSSID and the geo-coordinates, into their databases, e.g., Skyhook3
to register WiFi APs.
2.2 Evaluation of Current Location Computation Process
We conducted a series of experiments on different mobile devices installed with
Android, Windows Phone, and iOS operating systems to categorise the data flow
in the current location computation process. With the assistance of sniffers, such
as Wireshark [39] and tPacketCapture [36], we captured and analysed sequence
and location data transmission when using location-based apps, e.g., Navigation
and Friend Finder.
Observation. These experiments were designed to understand whether there is
any difference on the location calculation process on each of these three mobile
operating systems. Based on the results, all of them display common patterns
of location data retrieval. The user device collects the unique identifiers from
the surrounding network along with GPS data, and sends it to the location
3 Submit a Wi-Fi Access Point. See http://www.skyhookwireless.com/submit-access-
point (last access in March 2016).
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Fig. 2. Structure of (a) WiFi AP object and (b) cell-tower object sent to the location
provider [31].
Fig. 3. Structure of the location object received from the location provider [31].
provider to get the exact device location. Figure 2 shows the structure of the
WiFi and Cell-tower objects sent to the location provider. Once calculation is
performed, the location provider sends to the device the precise location in the
way of a geo-location object containing geo-coordinates. Figure 3 represents the
structure of the location object received from the location provider. In short, the
app developer over any mobile platform can utilize this location object to get
the user’s geo-location with no need of focusing on the details of the underlying
location technology. In the following section, we give the detailed description of
the process sequence.
Process Sequence. Figure 4 illustrates the sequence of processes and messages
involved in the current location computation architecture. Note that, on a smart-
phone, location sharing service settings must be ‘ON’ while using any location-
based app. If the location sharing is ‘OFF’, then the device prompts for changing
the setting from ‘OFF’ to ‘ON’; otherwise, user cannot use the service. Once the
app obtains the location object from OS, it is then used by the app provider
to send the corresponding reply to LBS query via the standard programming
interface/API [5].
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Fig. 4. Sequence diagram of current location computation process [31].
3 Related Work
Existing approaches to preservation of the location privacy can be classified into
three categories: 1. Mobile Platform4, 2. Location Query, and 3. Privacy-aware
Network Communication.
3.1 Mobile Platform
A few studies have proposed static and dynamic methods to detect privacy leaks
in mobile platforms. The former method statistically analyses apps by creating
permission mapping, generating call graphs and data flow analysis to report
privacy leaks for further auditing, e.g, AndroidLeaks [17] and PiOS [12] for An-
droid and Apple iOS, respectively. The application of dynamic methods involves
modification of the existing mobile platform. For example, TaintDroid [13] adds
taint tracking information to sensitive sources calls from apps, and it tracks
location data flow as it generated through applications during execution. Mock-
Droid [8] relies on instrumenting Android’s manifest permission mechanism to
mock sensitive data from OS resource, including location data, which can af-
fect apps’ usability and functionality. LP-Cache´ not only monitors the location
sources but also modifies, if required, the generated location data based on de-
fined user permissions. In another attempt[15], indistinguishability technique is
applied as location privacy preservation mechanism into the advertising and an-
alytics libraries as well as on installed apps; however, it does not give control
4 Throughout this paper, we use the terms mobile platform and operating system
interchangeably
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on the amount of WiFi and location data that is being shared with the loca-
tion provider. Moreover, indistinguishability technique increases computational
overhead on smartphones.
3.2 Location Query
Apps share location information with the provider in the form of LBS queries.
The transmission of such queries to the location server may allow attackers to
gain access to user location data. Privacy Enhancing Techniques (PET) like
k-anonymity, dummy locations, region cloaking, location perturbation and ob-
fuscation, and mix-zone pseudonyms have been applied to different architectures
for location query formation and privacy preservation from LBS providers [30,
37, 22]. Most of these techniques rely on theoretical assumptions - like trusted
infrastructure to provide the privacy protection, requiring a group of similar app
users to be at the same time and same place. The main issue with PETs and
cryptographic schemes is that it relies entirely on the data collection servers to
comply with location privacy.
Caching. Several authors have used caching scheme along with PETs to build
to a database consisting of different contents/datatypes used within location
based queries to be re-used in future LBS queries. MobiCache´ [40] applies k-
anonymity for caching location based queries. Similarly, Niu et al. [29] attempt to
improve k-anonymity based caching by adding dummy locations. Both proposals
require a trusted infrastructure to maintain privacy. Cache´ [3] maintains a local
cache within the device to reuse the data types available from applications in
future location based queries; however, storing entire LBS query data increases
the cache storage requirements. Besides, Cache´ also requires app developer to
modify the way app access location data. By contrast, LP-Cache´ caches the
network fingerprints and geo-coordinates, which reduces the storage overhead
drastically; it considers installed apps as black box, and therefore, does not
require app developer to modify the code, it works as a middleware between
the app and the mobile platform. All these cache-based systems either intent
to generalise or obfuscate the LBS query or minimise the number of queries
sent to the app providers, but they do not provide privacy from WiFi content
distributors. Besides, mobile devices not only send vast amounts of location
data to app providers but also to location providers creating different location
privacy shortcomings [2, 33]. In this regard, limited work has been published on
privacy preservation from the location provider’s perspective [10, 11]. Damiani
(2011) proposes a theoretical approach for privacy-aware geolocation-based web
services to encourage further research to minimise the amount of location data
being shared with the location provider. This is mainly due to that the location
provider is considered as the only source to get the user location when developing
any location-based app. In LP-Cache´, we minimise the process of wireless AP
data collection by the WiFi content distributors or location providers, and we
control information disclosure within the generated LBS query (e.g., points of
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interests (POIs) and nearest neighbor) since it will be sent to the third-party
app provider.
3.3 Privacy-aware Network Communication
Besides location queries, device’s IP address can also reveal user’s private loca-
tions. To this regard, anonymous communication protocols, e.g., Anonymizer [6]
and TOR [35], deal with anonymous service usage at the network layer while
communicating over Internet (i.e., the server cannot infer user’s location via re-
ceived device’s IP address along with the location query), and they are most
prominent and commonly used network layer solutions.
4 LP-Cache´ Model
In this section, we describe LP-Cache´’s threat model, design goals, architecture
and main processes’ sequence diagram.
4.1 Threat Model
Apps deliberately collect user’s sensitive data, including location and other sen-
sitive information as part of their operations. User tracking, identification and
profiling (i.e. personal habits, movement patterns, etc.) are fundamental threats
to location privacy [16, 37]. Furthermore, the current direct link of smartphones
to the location provider and the continuous flow of LBS queries that include
device’s exact geo-coordinates over network create a serious risk to the protec-
tion of users’ sensitive information, even more challenging, in the presence of a
malicious location provider and via advanced network sniffing practices.
LP-Cache´ computes the exact location within user device, without service
provider’s involvement, and trusts the device on the storage of sensitive data.
However, the user has still the option of giving consent for app providers or loca-
tion provider to access their location. Mobile network providers might, however,
collect user location data via cellular clients. It is also excluded from our model
the option of manually inserting the location data (e.g., street name, zip code,
post code) within LBS query.
4.2 LP-Cache´ Control Flow Architecture
LP-Cache´’s three main design goal are: 1) the third-party app provider will not
be able to infer the device’s exact location without getting uses’s consent; 2) the
user can set distinct privacy preferences for different apps and private places;
and 3) the model works independently without the need of modifying the app’s
code. Figure 5 depicts the block diagram for LP-Cache´ architecture; its main
components are:
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Fig. 5. LP-Cache´ architecture [31].
Permission Setter is the user interface (UI), which enables users to set and
manage their private places and apply improved personalised permissions
when running installed location-based apps. Once received the user inputs,
pre-set private locations are sent to the Private Location Manager module,
and permissions are sent to the Rule Mapper Module.
Request Manager is responsible to intercept the event of location access calls,
and then lead the app’s control flow to the Private Location Manager mod-
ule. Besides, it will also be in control of receiving the processed user location
(i.e., could be either anonymised or altered) from Rule Mapper, and then
delivering it to the app in order to maintain every session’s control flow.
Private Location Manager module’s main task is to detect unique identi-
fers of the surrounding WiFi APs and compare them with the stored net-
work fingerprints to determine whether the user is within the set of private
places. User inputs from the Permission Setter will create network finger-
prints for known private locations, which are then added or updated in the
Cach database. Moreover, it maintains a binary flag to detect private places.
In the case of a hit the location data is sent to the Rule Mapper. Otherwise,
the location is received from the Location Receiver. Whenever the Private
Location Manager receives a new private place request, the received loca-
tion is mapped to the detected network fingerprint and stored in the Cache´
database.
Rule Mapper dynamically collects and checks set permissions from Permis-
sion Setter. Once the representative location object is received from the
Private Location Manager, it applies the user permissions on the location
co-ordinates, alters them (if required), and outputs the processed location
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Fig. 6. Sequence diagram of location computation process using proposed model [31].
to the Request Manager module. If the flag is negative, then it forwards the
exact location.
Cache is the established on-device cached database, and it is routinely queried
by the Private Location Manager module, which can add, update and delete
the cached location data. The locations in cach are those which are to be pro-
tected, and they can also represent regions of space. Each entry is recorded
along with a network fingerprint and geo-location that is acquired from the
location provider.
Location Receiver module receives a location object, which includes the user
device’s geo-coordinates (as in Figure 3), from location providers and sends
it over to the Private Location Manager for further processing.
4.3 Process Sequence
LP-Cache´ modifies the current location resource handling process; however, the
involved entities (as in Section 2) remain the same. Figure 6 illustrates the
sequence of processes and messages involved in LP-Cache´:
1. At the event of app requesting the device location, our service will intercept
the request to get the location from the cache database instead of sending
the request to the location provider.
2. Upon receiving the location request, our service will scan the surrounding
network infrastructure.
Protecting Smartphone Users’ Private Locations through Caching 11
3. Using observed network frames our service will execute as follows:
(a) Our service compares the collected beacons with the stored network fin-
gerprints to retrieve corresponding stored representative location coor-
dinates.
(b) In the case of an unmatched entry on the database, the LP-Cache´ prompts
the user two options either input the location using UI, or allow the query
to be sent to location provider that will calculate and send the current
location coordinates. Note that this will only occur if the user has set
the current location as private but the geo-coordinates are not cached.
(c) The received location data for the encountered APs will be tracked within
the local cache database for future use.
4. User location coordinates can be altered based on the privacy settings. LP-
Cache´ provides three options for controlled information disclosure: (1) Adjust
Location Granularity, (2) Obfuscate Location, and (3) No Change. Com-
puted location is populated in the location object and sent to the app.
5. Once the app obtains the location object, it is then used by the app provider
to send the corresponding reply to LBS query via the standard programming
interface/API [5].
5 LP-Cache´ Implementation Requirements
In the following sections, we describe LP-Cache´’s implementation requirements.
LP-Cache´ orchestrates a mobile platform based location protection service to
modify the location resource handling process. For instrumenting the LP-Cache´
implementation, Android will be the best choice since it is open source; however,
it can also be implemented on other permission-based mobile platforms.
5.1 Bootstrapping
LP-Cache´ aims to protect user’s private places. Initially, LP-Cache´ does not have
enough information to function, the two main required information are private
places’s network fingerprints and geo-coordinates. LP-Cache´ cannot collect net-
work fingerprints and geo-cordinates for private places at runtime, as by the time
we have this information, other installed apps will have access to it. Therefore,
when LP-Cache´ first boots and before turning ‘ON’ location sharing settings,
user will have to do the initial setup, which includes allow WiFi AP scanning,
input geo-cordinates and set privacy choices (see Section 5.4). In 2013, Google
presented a new service API (also works on older Android versions) for location-
based apps that allows developers to use the new and advanced Location and Ac-
tivity API, i.e., they changed Location Manager to Fused Location Manager,
hence combining sensors, GPS, Wi-Fi, and cellular data into a single API for
location-based applications [19]. As a result, separating data from GPS PROVIDER
and NETWORK PROVIDER is no longer straight forward. LP-Cache´ addresses this is-
sue by preventing app’s location request to reach the Fused Location Manager
that collects and sends the network session data to the location provider. Instead,
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the requested location is retrieved from the on-device cache, and then, it is sent
to the requesting app (with privacy rules applied). Besides, geographic tool5 can
be incorporated in the LP-Cache’s UI to get the corresponding geo-cordinates.
This will allow LP-Cache´ to achieve effective privacy without affecting location
accuracy, at the same time, prevent from the non-authorised sharing of device’s
exact location and network session data.
5.2 Mobile Platform
For performance evaluation, there are two possible ways of implementing LP-
Cache´ location protection service. The first requires modifying the app’s loca-
tion accessing interfaces and intercepting location updates before they reach the
app provider. Whereas, the second option requires modifying the platform and
changing the location data before reaching the app.
App Code Modification. This comprises unpacking the app, rewriting the code
to work according to the new rules, and then repackaging it again, e.g.,[21].
However, app repackaging changes the signature and stops future updates, and
therefore, affects its functionality. Another way to modify app’s location access-
ing interfaces is through the creation of an Android service and allowing apps
to register with it. Then, Apps can use the location data provided by this ser-
vice. This approach is easy to implement but relies heavily on app developers to
modify their app’s code, which is highly infeasible and unrealistic. Nonetheless,
this approach can be used as simulated testing environment for any developed
service.
Platform Modification. For the sake of experimentation, we develop LP-Cache´
via platform modification. One of the main task is to add a system service, where
the class belongs to the location APIs; thus, it is placed in the android.location
package, which detects private locations via APs and can also be used by other
components when calling context. In Android, a context allows an app to interact
with the OS resources. Another task is to make LP-Cache´ communicate with
location requesting apps. On Android there are two methods to access user’s
location: 1) Location Manager Service (Old), and 2) Fused Location Manager
Service (New) that is a part of Google Play Services. Both methods require
the app to request a callback function to get regular updates by registering a
location listener. The app receives a new location object when a new location is
available, the callback function is invoked. Modifying these two Google services
is complicated, but there is a possibility to intercept the location object before it
reaches requesting apps. We will add a static context field to the location class,
which will be populated when the app is invoked; this will enable us to know
which app is currently requesting the location object, and also communicate with
the OS [15]. The created location object will have reference to the requesting
app’s context, and therefore, it can interact with our external service.
5 LatLong is a geographic tool. See http://www.latlong.net/ (last access in March.
2016)
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Algorithm 1 Location Calculation Algorithm [31]
Require: nx: Network Frames
Ensure: lr: Representative Location
1: nx = 0
2: read nx
3: while nx 6= null do
4: if nx = ni , ∀ i ∈ p then
5: (step 1) retrieve the corresponding lr
6: add flag f = (if private 1, else 0)
7: send lr
8: else
9: (step 2) request lr from user or location provider
10: set received lr to corresponding pi
11: update c
12: send lr
13: end if
14: end while
5.3 On-device Cache Database Creation
LP-Cache´ requires fixed wireless APs data (i.e., 802.11) to create cached database
of private locations. Initially, we decided to focus on WPS since it infers accu-
rate user location. However, we can later include other fixed radio sources (e.g.,
cell-tower unique identifiers).
Network Fingerprinting. We can distinguish two main types of WPS techniques
to determine the position of client devices with respect to APs [7]: 1) Signal
trilateration and 2) Fingerprinting. The former undertakes trilateration of Re-
ceived Signal Strength (RSS), Angle of Arrival (AoA), and Time of Flight (ToF)
from observed APs, and the later involves mapping observed APs signatures
with a stored database. LP-Cache´ uses fingerprinting to create cached location
database; however, fingerprinting performance is highly related to the number
of APs. Therefore, in Section 6 we have evaluated WiFi AP availability and con-
sistency. The detected network management frames/beacons are mapped with
the device’s representative geo-location to create a network fingerprint, which is
then stored in the local cached database, an example private location fingerprint
is shown in Equation 1. Moreover, to reduce storage and computation overhead,
our model only caches network fingerprints of private places (e.g., home, work,
frequently visited places or particular stores), and it relies on user input for ini-
tial pre-set up. The user will have to select the option (via LP-Cache´ UI) to
set current location as private place pi, and then fingerprint will be recorded.
Later, the private place will be detected automatically with respect to observed
beacons [nx], such that
pi = [n1], [n2], ..., [nx] → [lr] (1)
where pi represent i
th private place IDs, n is the scanned beacon, and lr is a
representative location for that private place. WiFi AP beacons [nx] consists of
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Algorithm 2 Enhanced Permissions Algorithm [31]
Require: lr: Representative Location
Ensure: l′r: Processed Location
1: up = User Input
2: read l, lg, f , up
3: if up = Adjust Granularity then
4: check granularity level gl
5: truncate(l, lg)
6: replace l to l′ and lg to l′g
7: return l′r
8: else if up = Obfuscate then
9: randomly generate angle θ
10: obfuscate(l, lg, θ)
11: replace l to l′ and lg to l′g
12: return l′r
13: else
14: unchanged
15: return l′r
16: end if
four attributes 〈SSID, BSSID/MAC address, Signal-strength, and Timestamp〉.
The private representative location [lr] consists of a tuple 〈Lattitude, Longitude,
and Accuracy〉.
In LP-Cache´, to set up network fingerprints at every private place, we mea-
sure the response rate as the ratio of detection count and the total number of
scans for each beacon:
Rlc,x =
∑nlc
i=1 bx,i
nc
, bx,i =
{
1 if beacon x found in ith scan
0 otherwise
(2)
where Rlc,x is the response rate of beacon x at the current private location lc
and, nlc is the total scan count since the private place was entered. The detection
count of each beacon is maintained to identify the frequently occurring beacons;
and therefore, beacons with higher response rate are used to create the network
fingerprint for the current private place [lc]. Rlc,x will be maintained in the LP-
Cache´ database to update the response rate of every detected beacon during a
specified time interval spent at private place [lc].
On-device Cache-based Location Calculation Algorithm. The detailed steps of
privacy-aware geo-location calculation process are summarised in Algorithm 1.
The surrounded beacons [nx] are scanned and compared to the list of private
WiFi fingerprints [ni] to detect private place [pi] stored in cached database [c].
Further, the representative [lr] is altered based on set permissions (see Section
5.4).
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5.4 Personalised Permissions for Location Sharing
A general LBS query consists of different attributes, e.g., LBS query {POI, Lat-
itude and Longitude, User-Info}, where included geo-coordinates estimate the
device’s geo-location. To satisfy one of the privacy property called controlled
information disclosure, we designed enhanced permission mechanism to control
these geo-coordinates before it is sent to app providers. When using LP-Cache´,
for every installed app and set private place, the UI provides three distinct
privacy settings: (1) Adjust Location Granularity, (2) Obfuscate Location and,
(3) No Change. In the first option, geo-coordinate truncation method adjusts
location precision level; in the second option, geo-coordinate transformation ob-
fuscate user’s location; whereas, in the third option, the exact unchanged geo-
coordinates are sent to the requesting app.
Enhanced Permissions Algorithm. Once LP-Cache´ receives an invoked location
object [lr], it alters the location data according to the enhanced permission set-
tings and returns processed location [l′r]. The steps involved in enhanced permis-
sion mechanism are summarised in Algorithm 2, where up is the set permission,
gl is the adjusted location precision level, l is the latitude, and lg is the longitude.
Geo-coordinates Truncation. The geographical coordinates are represented by a
tuple consisting of {latitude : 52◦28’59.200” N , and longitude : 1◦53’37.0001”
W}, where the last digits specify more accurate geo-location. Geo-coordinate
truncation method will enable us to adjust the location precision level, i.e., by
removing last digits and rounding the location accuracy from street to city level
or even more general. Generally, for any third party reuse, service providers or
data collectors assure in the EULA that this method will be applied on the
collected data since the truncated coordinates increase the ambiguity level [1].
On the contrary, LP-Cache´ applies this method on the user device with user’s
permission in order to minimise the user’s sensitive data collection and privacy
concerns.
Geo-coordinates Transformation. For privacy preservation, position transfor-
mation functions such as scaling, rotation and translation have been used by
location data distributors or anonymisers [24, 37]. In LP-Cache´, we use geo-
coordinate transformation on the device to obfuscate user’s private locations.
Our service represents the geo-coordinate transformation using scaling and ro-
tation, and denotes its parameters as a tuple 〈s, θ, (l, lg)〉, where s is the scaling
factor, θ is the rotation angle, and (l, lg) are the original coordinates. It applies
Equation 3 to generate transformed or obfuscated geo-cordinates (l′, l′g), where
angle θ is randomly generated.
l′ = θ(s.l)
l′g = θ(s.lg)
(3)
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Table 1. WiFi measurement dataset comparative summary.
1 Month 2 Months Total scans.
Total number of scans 25480 21140 46620
Distinct private locations selected 34 % Change
Total APs detected 486 497 2.26%
Average APs detected 396 393 - 0.76 %
6 Feasibility and Usability Analysis
LP-Cache´’s actual performance evaluation depends on the location-based apps
performance. In this section, we analise the WiFi AP data availability and con-
sistency to measure feasibility of WiFi fingerprinting method to be included
in LP-Cache´’s implementation. In [31], we presented a WiFi APs dataset sum-
mary for a month; we have extended the sample size for a couple of months
and conducted a comparative study of the observations from both, 1st and 2nd
month datasets to evaluate the scalability of the WiFi fingerprinting method.
For the sake of illustration, we have maintained unique ID and sequence for all
the selected 34 private places.
6.1 WiFi APs Availability and Consistency
Experimental Set-up. The experimental set-up to measure WiFi AP data avail-
ability and consistency consists of the following three steps:
1. Data collection. We collected beacons from fixed WiFi APs using WiEye
[38] and Network Info II [28] apps on Android smartphones that have
802.11a/b/g/n radio feature so they can operate in both 2.4GHz and 5GHz
bands at 34 different private places for a period of two months.
2. Location categorisation. App users are more concern about sharing their
private locations[2]; therefore, in our analysis, we selected three distinct
categorise of private places: 1. Home (i.e., residential place), 2. Work (i.e.,
commercial place), and 3. Arbitrary (i.e., any frequently visited place) to
determine categorical distribution pattern of WiFi APs.
3. Data analysis. We collected and statistically analysed the scanned WiFi AP
data. Table 1 compiles the included sample size and the measured percent-
age changes; whereas, Figure 7 shows the relative difference between WiFi
APs density, and Figure 8 depicts the relative average accuracy distribution
pattern of detected WiFi APs for each category over the 2 months period.
Observation 1. For each category of private places, experiments revealed the
following:
Home The results demonstrate that Wifi APs are fixed and frequent and the
difference between number of constant beacons and minimum number of sim-
ilar beacons is comparatively less, and therefore, it achieved highest accuracy
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Fig. 7. Measured density of 1 month (left) and 2 months (right) detected WiFi APs
at private places.
Fig. 8. Relative average accuracy distribution pattern of detected WiFi APs at private
places of 1 month (left) and 2 months (right).
rate. Moreover, the ratio of SSID to BSSID is 1:1, i.e., 1 SSID (abc) has 1
BSSID (a0:12:b3:c4:56:78), this makes fingerprints distinct so improving the
location detection performance.
Work This category has many fixed WiFi APs but with fluctuating signal
strengths, and therefore, the sequence of available APs changes. However,
the observed ratio of SSID to BSSID is many to one, i.e., 1 SSID has many
BSSIDs; therefore, in this case, SSIDs along with BSSIDs can be used as
unique identifiers to create a fingerprint to detect a private place dynami-
cally.
Arbitrary In this category, the data collector could select any frequently visited
locations, e.g., gym, shop, or friend’s home. Figure 8 demonstrates that the
outcome of this category is related to the other two categories, it either shows
results similar to home or work.
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The range of average accuracy for all the three categories of private places
falls between 75% to 97%. Hence, it is evident that smartphones regularly detect
similar beacons at frequently visited place, for place detection at least one beacon
should match with the stored fingerprints. Thus, the result demonstrates that
WiFi fingerprinting can be effectively used as private place detection source in
LP-Cache´. Nonetheless, to achieve efficient capability for place recognition via
beacons, a place discovering algorithm like [23] can be implemented (in future
work).
Observation 2. Table 1 shows comparative analysis of WiFi APs data that has
been scanned and collected during both 1st and 2nd month. Considering per-
centage changes, the number of total detected APs has increased with 2.26%
and the number of frequently detected APs remained without change, i.e, with a
negligible difference of -0.76%. Equation 2 has been used statistically to identify
frequently detected beacons whilst at a particular private place. Pre-set unique
IDs and a sequence for all the selected 34 private places allowed us to measure
the relative density and distribution pattern of the WiFi APs during both 1st
and 2nd month. Figure 7 shows the relative difference between WiFi APs den-
sity, and Figure 8 depicts the relative average accuracy distribution pattern of
detected WiFi APs for each category over the period on 2 months.
6.2 Estimated storage requirements
Location-based queries that are generated/received from running applications
and service providers include several attributes, and their data types require
vast amount of storage space. This is the case of some location privacy solu-
tions (e.g., [3, 40]) that apply caching techniques on location-based queries as
a resukt of their storage requirement. LP-Cache´ does not cache location-based
queries, instead it stores the WiFi AP data and geo-coordinates of users’ private
locations. Moreover, the user’s pre-set privacy rules are applied to the mapped
geo-coordinates at runtime. As a result, comparatively, LP-Cache´’s on-device
cache database does not demand massive storage requirement. By considering
the 802.1 Standard and datatypes sizes, Table 2 presents the storage require-
ments in bytes and database components, where network fingerprint table is a
tuple of 〈no.ofbeacons, beaconfield, counter〉, and permission table is a tuple
of 〈location, placeid, accuracy counter, no.ofprivateplaces〉. Moreover, Table
3 presents the measured changes in the 1st and the 2nd month of WiFi data
collected at 34 distinct private places. The results conclude that the average
change has increased by 2.07%. cache storage of total 25844 bytes that includes
the sum of permissions and network fingerprints for 34 distinct private places.
Thus, we can anticipate that the current mobile device internal storage capacity
is sufficient for the required storage [4].
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Table 2. Estimated storage
Field storage Size Database Com-
ponent
Size
Beacon field
BSSID/MAC 6 bytes
Network
fingerprint table
= (beaconfield +
SSID 32 bytes counter)×
Place ID 3 bytes no.ofbeacons
Timestamp/Age 8 bytes
Location field
Geo-coordinates 32 bytes
Permission table
= (location+ placeid
Region 32 bytes + accu. counter)×
no.ofprivateplaces
Table 3. Relative difference of monthly storage
Storage 1 Month 2 Months % Change
Network fingerprint 25272 bytes 25844 bytes 2.26% increase
Permissions 2380 bytes 2380 bytes No change
Total storage 27652 bytes 28224 bytes 2.07% total increase
6.3 Cache hits and cache misses
In LP-Cache´, up-to-date cache database and network fingerprint search result
accuracy are main challenges. The three possible outcomes when looking for
device’s location based on the scanned beacons are:
1. The location is cached and up-to-date This case comes with positive result,
and therefore, data can be used effectively.
2. The location is cached but is out-of-date This can occur if the network in-
frastructure changes, e.g., if router is changed then the cache data needs to
be updated. The overall results of Section 6.1 and Section 6.2 prove that
this case does not occur frequently. Nonetheless, for data accuracy a method
that uses Equation will be incorporated to detect and measure occurrence of
such situations of cache misses at runtime. Moreover, the developed method
can likewise be deployed to maintain data freshness and data consistency.
3. The location is not cached This occurs when the observed WiFi AP is not
cached and/or mapped to the private locations, then our service will have
to interact with user to update the location cache. Besides, the response
rate Rlc,x can be further extended to measure runtime occurrences of these
outcomes.
6.4 Ongoing Evaluation of Caching Method
Following WiFi data availability and consistency analysis, LP-Cache´’s feasibility
evaluation will be extended to analyse how frequently the cache needs to be up-
dated and what are the trade-offs between the cache update frequency and loca-
tion privacy and accuracy in order to measure computational and communication
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overheads. We also intent to conduct a thorough user study to determine usabil-
ity for the users to accommodate LP-Cache´’s functionality. Moreover, we plan to
extend the fundamental caching-related technical challenges such as cache hits
and cache misses, data freshness, data consistency, and estimated bandwidth re-
quirements in an advanced development and implementation of LP-Cache´ hence
paying special attention to storage-efficient caching.
7 Conclusion
Secure gathering and transmission of the location data by mobile apps while pre-
serving users’ privacy is a major concern that needs reconsideration. Evaluation
of current location handling process confirms that it is vulnerable to location
privacy attacks; therefore, we presented a privacy-aware model that provides
users with advanced location controls to mitigate major privacy threats. Within
a dataset generated in 2 months of experimental setting, we observed a 2.26%
change in detected WiFi APs at 34 distinct places and 2.07% change in estimated
storage. These results are promising and benefit deployment of LP-Cache´’s. In
this paper, we mainly focused on establishing the design decisions, implemen-
tation requirements, and on measuring the feasibility of LP-Cache´. Work in
progress is on (1) deploying our model on a mobile platform to measure its
functionality and efficiency while interacting with different location-based apps;
(2) carrying out run-time measurements of the cache storage over an extended
period of time, and (3) performing critical analysis of the network fingerprinting
and permission mapping methods with dynamic movement patterns. We plan to
further assess LP-Cache´’s scalability in future large scale scenarios and, address
end user as well as service providers concerns.
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